Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
complex, challenging, and inherently dangerous counterinsurgency environment in Iraq.
History is replete with illustrative examples of past counterinsurgencies and the study of these campaigns can provide relevant insight and perspective of the complexities and challenges confronting the counterinsurgency force. Through research and analysis, these examples can provide relevant insight into various types of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, as well as the successes and failures experienced in operating in these unconventional environments. The French Algerian War (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) provides one such illustrative case study. This project researches and examines three main elements from the French Algerian experience: the Algerian insurgency, the French counterinsurgency, and the political dimensions of the conflict. Citing both similarities and differences of the like elements in our current conflict in Iraq, e.g. Iraqi insurgency, U.S. counterinsurgency, and political dimensions, the selected elements for this project are intended to provide relevant insights and provide military leaders and planners a better understanding, perspective, and critical lens to view counterinsurgency campaigns in order to plan and execute more effectively in future conflicts.
CONTEMPORARY COUNTERINSURGENCY INSIGHTS FROM THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR (1954-1962)
We give express charge, that in our marches through the country, there be nothing compelled from the villages, nothing taken but paid for, none of the French upbraided or abused in disdainful language; for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner.
-William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act III Scene 6
Almost five years after the successful initial combat operations that kicked off warfare from 1776 to Iraq shows that we must approach it in a fundamentally different manner from our approach to conventional warfare. 1 History offers valuable insights into these unconventional approaches. Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are not a new phenomenon and history is replete with illustrative case studies. The ability to draw contemporary insights from past counterinsurgency operations can assist current and future leaders from making similar mistakes and providing a foundation on which to build effective responses. One particular historical example that has drawn a considerable amount of attention in the context of the challenges we are facing in Iraq is the French-Algerian War (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) . This particular French conflict has drawn the attention of President George W. Bush, as well as both political and military leaders in Washington, as the United States finds itself trying to find solutions while embroiled in a tough counterinsurgency fight. Through proper analysis and well-formulated research, the study of history can provide invaluable insights and lessons learned for current and future military leaders
The purpose of this paper is to explore selected elements of the counterinsurgency experience from the French-Algerian war that are both relevant and in some cases irrelevant to today's U.S. efforts in Iraq. To accomplish this purpose, the paper will examine the following three elements: The Algerian insurgency; the French counterinsurgency; and the political dimensions. Drawing relevant insights and seeing how the French conducted a counterinsurgency confronting the complexities experienced in the war in Algeria with both successes and failures may enable the U.S., both militarily and politically, to understand better and provide clarity to its efforts in Iraq.
Algerian Insurgency
Understanding and recognizing the motivations and desires, the organization and structure, as well as the strategy and operations of an insurgent force, is a critical first step for the counterinsurgent; i.e., knowing the enemy. In the study and analysis of the French-Algerian war and the current U.S. situation in Iraq, it is beneficial to draw relevant insights and understand the similarities and differences between the Algerian insurgency and the insurgency in Iraq through the elements listed above.
In Algeria, the insurgent goal was to establish an independent state within the framework of the principles of Islam, although most of the population remained ambivalent until the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) initiated a campaign of discrete urban terrorism. 2 As the preceding section indicates, at the start of the French-Algerian an Iraqi that AQ will provide them with a better future; peace, stability, and prosperity.
Elements and factions of AQ need to be severely dealt with in Iraq, but can be marginalized by first mitigating the instability being caused by secular violence, as well as confronting the outside support. Like in Algeria, the outside support that the Iraqi insurgency is receiving can be critical for their success. Within Iraq, depending on the region, province, or even neighborhood, U.S. and coalition forces may be dealing with an enemy or insurgent driven by very different ends, ways, and means.
Five years into the conflict, an intelligence gap continues to hamper U.S. forces in understanding two basic criteria; insurgent identity and numbers of insurgents.
Conflicting intelligence estimates have hampered the U.S. forces understanding of the organization and structure of the various insurgent elements. Knowing the enemy is fundamental, whether in a conventional or unconventional environment. In Algeria, the FLN/ALN established a hierarchical organization. French forces were able to systematically break down the organization. This cellular structure of the FLN/ALN was depicted in Gino Pontecarvo's movie, The Battle of Algiers, where the paratrooper commander, working on a blackboard, was systematically filling in the wire diagram of those insurgents identified, captured, or killed. As described in Alistair Horne's book, A Savage War of Peace; "…a complex organigramme began to take shape on a large blackboard, a kind of skeleton pyramid in which, as each fresh piece of information came from the interrogation centres; another name (and not always necessarily the right name) would be entered". 9 The French were able to eventually dismantle and crush the FLN. The problem in Iraq is that there appears to be no such static wiring diagram or organizational structure to identify, unravel, and systematically dismantle. raid with the primary purpose of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit, e.g. opening fire on a crowded street or executing a clearing operation that creates more enemies than it takes off the streets.
11
This can be termed as classic provocation tactics; provoking the counterinsurgent to respond in a way that will have negative effects to the force's mission. At times, the determination of an appropriate response can sometimes mean no response at all if the outcome of the action will ultimately be counterproductive. Despite early failures on the part of U.S. and coalition forces, avoiding overreaction to enemy actions has improved in Iraq, especially following the internationally highlighted allegations in Haditha of an inordinate number of civilians killed following an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack on a Marine infantry squad. U.S. forces need to exhibit a high degree of tactical patience in achieving objectives, rather than overreact and alienate the populace.
The above analysis and focus on the Algerian insurgency provides insight and understanding of one particular insurgent force. The Algerian insurgency did not possess the size, strength, or capability of the French forces and had to resort to asymmetric tactics, primarily urban-based terrorism. The same type of tactics can be attributed to the various insurgent groups in Iraq. Although there are some similarities between the Algerian insurgency and the insurgency in Iraq, it can only be seen as a loose parallel, while still providing relevant insight. As Thomas Hammes states, "Each insurgency rests in the culture, the history, and the situation of that country…you don't look for specific answers but patterns of thoughts and ideas." (enacted under a system of quadrillage in which the city was divided into controlled "squares"-each one conforming to a regional command) in addition to extrajudicial preemptive detentions of FLN suspects. 13 The French military actions also included torture to gain information on the FLN organization, which will be discussed later. The The Americans promised us rights and liberty…and my colleagues and I waited to make our decision on whether to fight until we saw how they would act. They should have come and just given us food and some security…It was then that I realized that they had come as occupiers and not as liberators and my colleagues and I then voted to fight." 18 It is a truism of counterinsurgency that a population will give its allegiance to the side that will best protect it. 19 The U.S. military has initiated an approach to counter the sentiment expressed by the Iraqi above through training and education. Predeployment cars and even children leaving school had been stoned; fatmas, or domestic servants, told their employers that they had been warned to no longer work for them. 21 On walls graffiti appeared overnight exhorting: "Muslims awaken!" "It's the Muslim flag that will float over North Africa!" Or, with more direct menace: "Francais, you will be massacred by the Muslims!" 22 that an Iraqi government would be quickly installed under a UN mandate. Instead, the U.S. found itself going it alone and without a plan to contend with a situation that gave the insurgent elements valuable time to organize, recruit, and begin to conduct attacks against the U.S. and coalition forces and discrediting all efforts to stand up an interim government. There is no going back to correct this egregious error, but it can serve as a lesson for future potential insurgent environments. The fact that military planners apparently didn't consider the possibility that sustained and organized resistance could gather momentum and transform itself into an insurgency reflects a pathology that has long afflicted governments and militaries everywhere: the failure not only to recognize the incipient conditions for insurgency, but also to ignore its nascent manifestations and arrest its growth before it is able to gain initial traction and in turn momentum. 25 This was a central point in a RAND study of the British experience with insurgencies in the 1950's: "Late recognition of an insurgency," the report stated, "is costly, insofar as the insurgents have the opportunity to gain a foothold before facing any organized opposition." 26 For strategic leaders and planners not to have planned for the worst case or wild card scenarios is negligent and is directly responsible for the deteriorating developments that followed the initial ground operations.
Lack of Counterinsurgency Doctrine
Another insight that is relevant between the two conflicts is the lack of counterinsurgency doctrine. David Galula is quoted in his book, Pacification in Algeria:
1954-1962, "In my zone, as everywhere in Algeria, the order was to "pacify". But exactly how? The sad truth was that, in spite of all out past experience, we had no single, official doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare." 27 To counter this lack of doctrine, the Although it may take time and a considerable amount of tactical patience, building an effective and reliable HUMINT network can only be done by building trust, confidence, and empowering the indigenous population with security and opportunity. A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy should offer alternative sources of identity and empowerment for the bored, disillusioned, and disempowered. 34 By doing this, it will enable forces to build a HUMINT network when used in conjunction with other forms of intelligence gathering will increase the overall effectiveness in defeating an insurgency.
Torture and abuse to gather information is not only ineffective; it is immoral, illegal, and unprofessional.
Political to understand these parallels and to learn the right lessons for applying effective solutions. Warfare in the 21 st century will be dominated by persistent conflict and irregular wars. To study insurgency/counterinsurgency experiences from the past can provide a critical lens to view future conflicts, but at the same time not to apply the wrong lessons. We cannot assume that 21st century insurgency is so like its 20th century predecessor and that old solutions can simply be dusted off and applied. 39 The
French Algerian War (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) provided just one for future strategic leaders to study, analyze, and understand in order to be more effective in counterinsurgency environments in the future.
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